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Notwithstanding the lack of federal court decisions in this area of the
law, this Article determines that tattoos meet the requirements of
copyrightability in the United States—originality and fixation in a
tangible medium of expression. This Article examines the challenges
presented by providing copyright protection for tattoos. In particular,
this Article responds to the expert testimony of Professor David
Nimmer, the author of a treatise often cited in the field of copyright
law, in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. The Whitmill
case concerns the well-known, prominent tattoo on the face of former
heavyweight boxing champion Michael Gerard “Mike” Tyson. In that
case, Nimmer opined that tattoos are not copyrightable. While the
district court excluded Nimmer’s testimony on the basis that it
constituted legal opinion, he raised several objections to the
copyrightability of tattoos. This Article not only challenges Nimmer’s
conclusion, but also his underlying rationale.
To date, no cases concerning the copyrightability of tattoos have
gone to trial. However, the Whitmill case, which reached the
preliminary injunction stage, and a handful of other copyright
lawsuits have shed some light on how the courts might analyze the
unique issues that arise in the determination of copyrightability of
tattoos and the problems that flow from providing copyright
protection to these creative works. This Article concludes with
encouragement for tattoo artists to enforce their rights in their artwork
in court. The filing of such lawsuits will likely lead to decisions that
recognize the protectability of tattoos, which will remove tattoos from
the fringes of the law into one of the categories of copyrightable
subject matter, and remedy the harm to tattoo artists as a result of
exploitation of their works. Such legal precedent will, in turn,
empower more tattoo artists to regain control of their works in mass
media.
INTRODUCTION

F

ormer heavyweight boxing champion Michael Gerard “Mike”
Tyson paid a tattoo artist in 2003 to mark his face with a Maori1
style tattoo. The tattoo created an unforgettable image of Tyson and
grew to be famous for its beautiful spiral patterns that capture the
1 Noam Cohen, On Tyson’s Face, it’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2011, at A1. See Maori Culture, MAORI.COM, http://www.maori.com (last visited Jan.
28, 2012) (stating that the Maori are the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand
whose defining cultural aspects include “art, legend, tattoo (moko), performances (notably
kapa haka), customs, hospitality and community”).
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essence of tribal designs. After receiving the facial tattoo, Tyson
continued his boxing career and appeared in various media, including
2
films, television programs, and video games.
A testament to the notoriety of Tyson’s tattoo was the decision of a
major movie studio, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., to place the
same tattoo on the face of another actor in The Hangover Part II, the
3
sequel of a popular comedic motion picture. Tyson’s former tattoo
artist, S. Victor Whitmill, then sued, claiming copyright ownership in
Tyson’s tattoo and infringement of that copyright by Warner Bros.
4
Entertainment, Inc. The initial issue in this case will arise in all
lawsuits involving an alleged copyright in a tattoo: the validity of the
alleged copyright, namely, whether the tattoo meets the
5
copyrightability requirements under federal law.
Copyrightable works are expressed in a variety of forms—from
6
7
buildings and architectural plans, to computer programs, to video
8
games. Further, federal copyright law seems clear on the
protectability of original paintings and many other types of creative
9
works. However, what if the creative work is embodied not on a
canvas, but on an individual’s body?
2 Mike Tyson, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005512/ (last visited June 6,
2013).
3 Complaint at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 2011 WL 2038147 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) [hereinafter
Whitmill Complaint] (involving a tattoo artist alleging infringement of copyright in tattoo
design).
4 Id.
5 This Article focuses on the copyrightability of tattoos, not the ownership and
enforcement of tattoos, including the particular violations of the Copyright Act that might
result from their use. These issues are appropriate subject matter for a separate article.
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012) (including architectural works within the “works of
authorship” category, but extending protection only to those works created on or after
December 1, 1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 113 (discussing the scope of exclusive rights in
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, including architectural plans); 17 U.S.C. § 120
(discussing the scope of exclusive rights in architectural works).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 117. See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Intellectual
Property Rights in Video, Electronic, and Computer Games, 7 A.L.R. FED. 2D 269 (2005)
(discussing many federal court cases involving intellectual property rights in video,
electronic, and computer games).
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also 17 U.S.C. § 113; Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual
Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing copyrightable elements of
computerized video game after claim of copyright and trade dress infringement by
manufacturer against competitor); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d
832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See generally Buckman, supra note 7.
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining the subject matter of copyright); see also D. NIMMER,
1–2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][1] (1965) (providing an extensive discussion of
the subject matter of copyright and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and the degree
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Tattoos appear to meet the requisites of copyright protection —in
some cases, they are original works of authorship, and in almost all
instances, they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression—and fit
11
within a category of copyrightable subject matter. Over the years,
Congress has extended copyright protection to additional categories
12
of subject matter, and copyright law has been extended to protect a
13
multiplicity of media and new technologies as they develop. Yet,
the copyrightability of tattoos is still in question.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides for copyright
protection “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
14
medium of expression.” Arguably, the protectability of a tattoo is no
different from any other creative work that meets the statutory
15
requirements of copyrightability as set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
However, the protectability of tattoos is an area of the law that
remains unaddressed by the courts. While a few tattoo artists have
filed lawsuits in federal courts, there are as yet no published decisions
that address the issue of copyright protection for tattoos on the human
16
body. In fact, no tattoo artist has yet been successful in receiving
enforcement by the court of his copyright in a tattoo.
of creativity required to constitute a work of art). For examples of case law, see Thomas
Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 977 (1971); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Justice
Holmes discussing the still-prevailing rule regarding the creativity required of a work of
art); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
10 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
11 Works of authorship must fall under one of several categories of subject matter in
order to be eligible for copyright protection, namely, literary works; musical works,
including any accompanying words; dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works. Id.
Tattoos fall under the category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which “include
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and
technical drawings, including architectural plans.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
12 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (extending federal copyright protection to sound
recordings on February 15, 1972); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (extending federal
copyright protection to buildings on December 1, 1990).
13 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (explaining that it is not an infringement for the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy).
14 See id. § 102(a).
15 See id.
16 See, e.g., Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-198 BR (D.Or. Feb. 10, 2005) (tattoo
artist alleging tattoo design was infringed when it appeared in defendants’ advertisement
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The objective of this Article is to address the ambiguity regarding
the protectability of tattoos due to the lack of published court
decisions in this area of the law, and the negative impact such
ambiguity has on the tattoo industry—specifically, the rights of tattoo
artists and their clients/customers (hereinafter referred to as
“customer” or “client”). This Article traces the evolution of copyright
law as it pertains to the protectability of tattoos and identifies
unanswered questions regarding this particular type of artwork.
Finally, it analyzes the issues and concerns that arise when leaving
this area of law unresolved—a failure to protect tattoos as works of
art and tattoo artists’ loss of control over their work.
Part I of this Article defines the most popular type of body art,
17
commonly known as a “tattoo.” It briefly explores how body art is
viewed and interpreted within society, specifically in the United
States. Part II of this Article provides an overview of copyright
lawsuits concerning tattoos, particularly the Whitmill action; Reed v.
18
Nike, Inc., an earlier copyright lawsuit involving former NBA
basketball player Rasheed Wallace, representing one of the first cases
19
to assert copyright infringement of a tattoo; and Gonzalez v.
Transfer Technologies, Inc., a case regarding the use of copyrighted
20
designs as temporary tattoos.
Part III of this Article examines the language of the Copyright Act
of 1976—the federal statute protecting artists’ original works—in
featuring the wearer of the tattoo); see also Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3, at *1 (tattoo
artist alleging infringement of copyright in tattoo design).
17 While the scope of this Article is limited to the copyrightability of tattoos, some
scholars have expanded the scope of their analyses beyond tattoos to other forms of body
art. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 99
n.5 (2003) (acknowledging that while the article focuses on copyright, trademark, and
publicity issues relating to tattoos and makeup designs, the “analysis presumably would
apply to other forms of body art as well, such as original hair designs or an original
arrangement of piercings”).
18 Complaint, Reed v. Nike, Inc., 3:05-CV-00198, 2005 WL 1182840 (D.Or. Feb. 10
2005) (dismissed Oct. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Reed Complaint] (alleging infringement of
Copyright Registration Number VA 1-265-074).
19 See Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities,
Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 315, 316
n.5 (2006). However, after filing the complaint, Reed was issued Copyright Registration
Number VA 1-236-392, Reed, No. 3:05-CV-198 BR. In light of the issuance of this
additional registration, Reed filed an amended complaint alleging that the defendants had
also infringed that copyright. See Reed Complaint, supra note 18.
20 See Gonzales v. Transfer Techs., Inc., 301 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff alleging
copyrights on designs intended to be imprinted on t-shirts were infringed when defendant
copied and sold designs as temporary tattoos).
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order to determine whether the statute is applicable to tattoos. This
Part analyzes the issue of whether tattoos are original works of
authorship (the first essential element of copyrightability), including
whether tattoos possess the requisite creativity to qualify as
21
copyrightable works. This Part then explores how the chosen
medium affects the analysis of copyrightability of the work and
22
considers whether tattoos are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression—the second essential element of copyrightability set forth
23
in the Copyright Act.
The Article concludes that tattoo artists should seek to protect and
24
enforce the copyrights in their works. The filing of such lawsuits
will more likely lead to decisions that not only recognize the
protectability of tattoos, but also address the harm to the tattoo artists,
who are often the copyright owners, as a result of the exploitation of
their works.

21 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.”).
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation
of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.”).
23 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring that works be “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” in order to be copyrightable).
24 Recent interviews with tattoo artists suggest that the tattoo industry disfavors use of
intellectual property law as a means of preventing exploitation of their works. Matthew
Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property Law and Norms Among Tattoo
Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2012) (arguing “tattoo artists view formal
intellectual property law as ineffective, and consequently, they ignore it”). Alternatively,
the industry has created its own norms-based system. Id. The effectiveness of such socialnorms-based regimes is beyond the scope of this Article, which considers the
copyrightability of tattoos. However, it has been determined that the social norms regime
is ineffective at preventing violations of tattoo artists’ rights outside of the tattoo industry.
Id. at 1170. While the majority of tattoo artists may prefer to resolve such disputes without
attempting to use copyright law, there are a few tattoo artists who have asserted their rights
in an effort to prevent use by media companies. This seems to suggest that at least some of
these artists are concerned about widespread exploitation of their works, particularly when
it is highly visible to the public, such as in a television advertisement or a motion picture.
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I
WHAT IS A TATTOO?
The word “tattoo” is derived from the Tahitian term “tatua,”
25
meaning “to mark.” A “tattoo” is “an indelible mark or figure fixed
upon the body by insertion of pigment under the skin or by production
26
of scars.” Tattoos are limited to affixation on the skin, presumably
27
of a human being.
For centuries, tattoos have been displayed on the bodies of people
28
of various cultures throughout the world. The practice of adding
decorative designs to the skin has recently gained social acceptance in
29
the United States and, as a general rule, has become more
30
commonplace in Western culture. Indeed, the technique of tattooing
25 See Randy Schueller, Tattoo, in 7 HOW PRODUCTS ARE MADE 384 (Deirdre
Blanchfield ed., 7th ed. 2011).
26 Tattoo,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tattoo
(last visited Dec. 30, 2011) (reporting that the first known use of the word “tattoo” took
place in 1777).
27 This Article does not contemplate any copyright issues relating to the branding of
human beings (a practice of some fraternal organizations), livestock, or other animals.
28 See Jane Caplan, Introduction, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY, at xi (Jane Caplan ed., 2000) (classifying tattooing
as “one of many forms of irreversible body alteration, including scarification, cicatrization,
piercing and branding, and it is the [sic] probably the oldest and most widespread of these”
and stating that physical evidence of tattooing dates back to the late fourth millennium
B.C. in Europe and about 2000 B.C. in Egypt and “can be found in virtually all parts of the
world at some time”); see also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 138 (“For millennia,
the human body has served as a medium of sublime artistic expression.”).
29 See Harkins, supra note 19, at 314; Matthew Alan Cherep, Barbie Can Get A Tattoo,
Why Can’t I?: First Amendment Protection of Tattooing in A Barbie World, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 331, 331 (2011) (“The culture of tattoos has shifted greatly over the last
fifty years; once seen as symbols of a countercultural movement, tattoos have pushed their
way into the mainstream.”); Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work:
Re-Examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111,
1142 (2006) (arguing that the meaning of tattoos is changing and discussing the potential
message conveyed by employers as a result of hiring a tattooed employee, and arguing that
due to the increasing acceptance of tattoos as a means of self-expression, an employer’s
ban of visible tattoos may be adverse to the employer’s intended message).
30 See Fisk, supra note 29, at 1142 (“The meaning of tattoos appears to be undergoing a
significant transition in the contemporary United States. Once considered the favored
adornment of sailors of the lowest rank, and later regarded the insignia of renegade
motorcyclists and gang members, tattoos are now said to be widely accepted among the
younger generation.”). However, with the surge in the practice of tattooing in American
culture also comes “second thoughts” decision-making concerning tattoo removal. See
Bernadine Healy, M.D., The Dangerous Art of the Tattoo, U.S. NEWS (July 25, 2008),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/articles/2008/07/25/the-dangerous-art
-of-the-tattoo (“Perhaps not surprisingly, most patients seeking removal are women,
prompted by a disproportionate level of psychological stress and even tattoo stigma.”).
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is increasingly recognized as a form of art in Western culture.
Tattoo artists may have professional art training, association with the
larger art world, specialization in certain types of design work, and an
32
appreciation for the value of the work of other tattoo artists.
Since the 1960s, tattooing has transformed into an increasingly
33
commercialized practice with a diverse clientele. The “‘tattoo
community’ [is] more visible and more organized, with the
development of large scale and well-publicized conventions, an
expanding number of magazines, books, and now websites devoted to
tattoo art, and—a sure sign of coming of age—publications and
34
museums devoted to the documenting of its own past.” A few years
ago, it was estimated that there were about 15,000 tattoo parlors in
35
America making more than 2.3 billion dollars annually. Other
intellectual property scholars have noted a study documenting a
dramatic increase in the number of tattoo parlors across the United
States—rising from about 300 tattoo parlors in the 1970s to about
36
4000 in 1999. In 2012, this number grew to an estimated 21,000
37
tattoo parlors in the United States.
The choice to adorn the body with a tattoo crosses generational
lines in the United States, but statistics suggest that the younger the
38
American, the more likely he or she is to have a tattoo. Further, a
study by the Pew Research Center found that more than one third
(thirty-six percent) of Americans ages eighteen to twenty-five have a
39
tattoo; forty percent in the twenty-six to forty range. In contrast, the
While the removal of a tattoo is possible, the process is difficult, expensive, painful, and
not highly successful. Id.
31 Juliet Fleming, The Renaissance Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY 61 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000) (referring to the growth
of tattooing in the West as a “tattoo renaissance”).
32 See id.
33 Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing and Piercing in
Cotemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN HISTORY 240 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000).
34 Id.
35 Bruce Kennedy, In Tattoo Business, Profits are Hardly Skin Deep, NBC NEWS (Oct.
15, 2010, 2:30 PM) [hereinafter Tattoo Business], http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
39641413/ns/business-us_business/t /tattoo-business-profits-are-hardly-skin-deep/#.
36 See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 101.
37 Bruce Kennedy, Changed Your Mind About that Tattoo?, MSN MONEY (Dec. 5,
2012, 3:15 PM), http://money.msn.com/now/post.aspx?post=dde0eb05-01a1-485c-a13f-3
ec71810bb40.
38 Tattooed Gen Nexters, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Pew Study],
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/tattooed-gen-nexters/.
39 See id.
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study found only about ten percent of people ages forty-one to sixty40
four are tattooed. An online poll taken by Harris Interactive reported
that as of January 2012, “one in five U.S. adults has at least one tattoo
(21%) which is up from the 16% and 14% who reported having a
tattoo when this question was asked in 2003 and 2008,
41
respectively.”
Tattooing is increasingly used for medical and non-medical
42
cosmetic applications. Often, and most relevant to this Article,
tattooing is a method of self-expression by the tattoo artist and the
43
client. Scholars of the practice of tattooing have referred to the
tattoo as “the repository and expression of ‘unconventional,
individualistic’ values” and “the only form of human expression we
44
have left that has magic to it.”
Tattooing has gained popularity in the United States, but it has a
45
history of negative associations in Western culture. While society at
large is growing to accept the practice of tattooing as more
commonplace, the legal community (including corporate IP
rightsholders who may be defendants in tattoo copyright lawsuits) is
slow to embrace this form of art as protectable work. In addition,
tattooed people and tattoo artists traditionally have not viewed

40 Id.; see David Whelan, Ink Me, Stud, 23 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 9, 9 (Dec. 2001)
(reporting that “[ten] percent of Americans have or have had a tattoo, [two] percent have a
body piercing other than an earring and [four] percent have both”) (quoted in Cotter &
Mirabole, supra note 17, at n.12).
41 One in Five U.S. Adults Now Has a Tattoo, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/97
0/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx.
42 See Schueller, supra note 25, at 386 (“For example, tattoos can be used to obscure
the reddish purple birthmarks known as ‘port-wine’ stains. They may also be used to
improve the skin color of patients with vitaligo [sic], a disorder that causes the
melanocytes in the skin to shut down and stop producing normal skin color. Tattooing is
also being used to create permanent makeup, such as eye liner or blush, for burned or
disfigured victims.”).
43 Fisk, supra note 29, at 1143 (discussing popular culture’s increasing consideration of
tattoos and tattooing as expressive activity, yet also recognizing the messages conveyed
“are varied, extremely context specific, and change rapidly” and stating further that in a
commercial context “[t]he wearer, the employer, and the customer may be conveying and
receiving quite different messages”).
44 Fleming, supra note 31.
45 See Jordan S. Hatcher, Drawing in Permanent Ink: A Look at Copyright in Tattoos in
the United States 3 (Apr. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=815116 (stating, for example, that
“[i]n the West, many associate tattoos with prisons, biker culture, or gang membership”).
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themselves as part of the intellectual property community. This
lingering disfavor of tattoos has impacted the court system—there
47
have been very few cases filed in federal court. In fact, no tattoo
artist has yet been successful in receiving enforcement by a court of
his copyright in a tattoo. The paucity of tattoo copyright cases and the
absence of a judicial recognition of the protectability of tattoos may
further contribute to tattoo artists’ reluctance to seek remedies in the
48
courtroom.
II
A DEARTH OF TATTOO COPYRIGHT CASES
Whether a tattoo created in the first instance on a human being can
be copyrighted is an unsettled question that courts have yet to
49
address. While there are no published opinions that resolve the issue
50
of whether tattoos are protected by copyright law, a federal judge of

46 However, this may be changing. Compare id. (“The tattoo industry traditionally
seems to have viewed itself as outside of intellectual property law (IP), and this may be
part of the reason why very little case law has materialized in this area.”), with Beasley,
supra note 24, at 1164–65 (several tattoo artists interviewed by the author stating they
view their designs as art and agree with the underlying premise of copyright law, that “an
artist should get credit for his work”).
47 However, “when body art cases finally make their way into court, judges too will
have to take the claims of body artists seriously because, as Justice Holmes once
suggested, judges are not art critics.” Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 102.
48 These factors may contribute to the tattoo industry’s decision to rely on a norm-based
system. See Beasley, supra note 24.
49 See Harkins, supra note 19, at 332 (“In years past, copyright protection was a nonissue or ignored because tattooists were either too reticent to sue a customer or too
complacent to challenge tattoo lore, favoring any and all available exposure for their
work.”); see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1769 (2006) (“Until
recently there has been little copyright litigation despite an apparent norm of widespread
tattoo design copying.”); Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 98–99 (“[W]e are not aware
of any cases yet that have discussed the unauthorized reproduction of trademarked words
or symbols in tattoos or other body art . . . .”); Warner Bros.’ Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of David Nimmer, ¶ 18,
Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 [hereinafter Nimmer Declaration] (“At the outset, let us
consider case law. My review of published decisions has uncovered no case that usefully
explicates the issue . . . . In terms of cases that treat a plaintiff’s allegation to own an
interest, protectable under copyright law, in a tattoo, I have found none.”).
50 See Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (dismissed E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011);
Complaint, Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 5:12-CV-3172, 2012 WL 6852208 (W.D. La.
Dec. 31, 2012) (dismissed Apr. 9, 2013); Escobedo v. THQ Inc., 2:12-CV-02470, 2012
WL 5815742 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2012); Ira Boudway, Hey, Pro Athletes: Your Tattoo Is
Going To Get You Sued, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www
.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-04/hey-pro-athletes-your-tattooed-arms-are-going-to
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
orally expressed her thoughts on the copyrightability of tattoos in
51
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
A. Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
S. Victor Whitmill filed a complaint against Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern
52
District of Missouri on April 28, 2011. In the complaint, Whitmill
alleged that he “created and applied an original and distinctive tattoo
to the upper left side of the face of the former, world heavyweight
champion boxer Michael Gerard ‘Mike’ Tyson” on February 10,
53
2003. Whitmill also alleged that on the same day, Tyson signed a
release acknowledging “that all artwork, sketches and drawings
related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his] tattoo” were the
property of Whitmill, who was doing business as Paradox-Studio of
54
Dermagraphics. Further, Whitmill, an award-winning visual artist,
stated that the artwork he tattooed onto Tyson’s face “is one of the
55
most distinctive tattoos in the nation.”

-get-you-sued?campaign_id=DN090413 (noting that Escobedo’s complaint is now part of
THQ’s bankruptcy proceedings).
51 See Noam Cohen, Citing Public Interest, Judge Rules for ‘Hangover II,’ N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/citing
-public-interest-judge-rules-for-hangover-ii/. Judge Catherine D. Perry did not issue a
written opinion, but explained the court’s ruling and reasoning during the hearing on
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction
Hearing at 2, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (motion denied May 24, 2011) [hereinafter
Whitmill Hearing Transcript]; see also Meredith Hatic, Note, Who Owns Your Body Art?:
The Copyright and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 423 (2013) (“Before Whitmill v. Warner Brothers in 2011, no
court had ever directly addressed the question of whether copyrights are in fact
copyrightable.”). See generally Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP [hereinafter Whitmill Injunction
Memo].
52 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. This statement raises significant questions as to whether this “distinction” is
attributable to Whitmill’s artistic or professional skill, Tyson’s fame, the particular style of
the tattoo, a combination of these factors, or other considerations. The discussion of the
copyrightability of tattoos found in Part III of this Article provides more insight
concerning these issues. An analysis of copyright ownership, which is beyond the scope of
this Article, is also relevant to the evaluation of such factors.
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Whitmill did not sketch the original design on paper or any other
56
“traditional” medium. The design was created in the first instance
57
on Tyson’s face. Thus, the Whitmill case presents an issue of first
impression as to whether copyright protection arises from the creation
58
of an original work of authorship fixed on human flesh.
Whitmill claimed that Warner Bros. infringed upon his copyright
59
based upon the production company’s unauthorized copying of the
60
tattoo onto the face of another actor in its motion picture The
61
Hangover Part II. Whitmill further claimed that Warner Bros.
infringed his copyright “through its unauthorized copying,
distribution[,] and public display of the Pirated Tattoo in advertising
and promotion for the Movie and by making an unauthorized
derivative work—namely, the Pirated Tattoo—that is based upon and
copies virtually all of the copyrightable subject matter of the Original
62
Tattoo.”
63
Whitmill sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, actual
64
65
damages and profits, and costs and attorney’s fees. He moved for
56 Whitmill Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 17–18 (first session, May 23, 2011)
(Whitmill testifying that what he drew on Tyson’s face was not a copy from a book).
57 Id.
58 Whitmill Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 71 (second session, May 23, 2011)
(Defendant’s counsel asserting that it was a “case of first impression—whether you can
have a copyright on human flesh”).
59 The court concluded that the facts were largely uncontested and that “[n]either Tyson
nor Warner Brothers sought approval from Whitmill [to reproduce the tattoo] before either
movie.” Id. at 2. Further, the court determined that Whitmill had not granted Warner Bros.
a license, implied or otherwise, to “use the tattoo.” Id. at 4.
60 Mike Tyson appeared in the The Hangover and The Hangover Part II. See Verified
Answer to Complaint by Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752, at 5, ¶
15-16 (filed May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Answer] (“Warner Bros. states that
Mr. Tyson appeared, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, in the first Hangover movie, as well as in an
advertising poster for the first Hangover movie, and that thousands of images of Mr.
Tyson, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, have appeared in magazines, television and on the internet
since February 10, 2003.”) Warner Bros. admitted that Tyson’s tattoo and the tattoo
appearing on actor Ed Helms’s face in The Hangover Part II are similar, but denied that
there was any copyrightable expression in Tyson’s tattoo or that the tattoo on Helms’s face
was pirated. Id.
61 See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3.
62 See id. at 7, ¶ 18. While Tyson appeared in both Hangover movies, there were no
non-Tyson uses of the tattoo in the first movie. Whitmill Hearing Transcript, supra note
51, at 2 (May 24, 2011) (Judge Catherine D. Perry noting, “[t]he first movie didn’t do
anything except show Mr. Tyson’s face”).
63 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3, at *1 (Whitmill seeking to enjoin Warner Bros.
from releasing its motion picture, The Hangover Part II, and from making any use of the
tattoo in the film or otherwise). See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012) (“Any court having
jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section
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a preliminary injunction to stop the advertising and release of The
66
Hangover Part II, which was due to be released on May 26, 2011.
On May 24, 2011, Judge Catherine D. Perry denied Whitmill’s
67
motion to preliminarily enjoin the release of The Hangover Part II.
However, she expressed sympathy for the tattoo artist’s claims,
stating that Whitmill had a “strong likelihood of prevailing on the
68
merits for copyright infringement.” Judge Perry elaborated on her
analysis of Whitmill’s likelihood of success on the merits in
69
70
connection with Warner Bros.’ fair use or parody defense, noting
Warner Bros.’ reproduction of Whitmill’s tattoo “did not comment on
the artist’s work or have any critical bearing on the original
1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”).
64 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3, at *1 (Whitmill demanding actual damages and
profits from Warner Bros.). See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (“The copyright owner is entitled to
recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit
attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.”).
65 See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 3, at *1; see also 17 U.S.C. § 505 (“In any civil
action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or
against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.”).
66 Whitmill Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 3 (May 24, 2011).
67 See id.
68 Cohen, supra note 51 (Judge Perry conceding “she should have enjoined the studio
from releasing the film—a decision that could have cost the studio as much as $100
million. But ultimately she concluded that the harm to the ‘public interest’ from stopping
the release of the movie outweighed the harm to Mr. Whitmill.”).
69 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”). The
fair use provision of the Copyright Act also sets forth illustrative categories of
noninfringement, such as use for the purposes of “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” Id.
70 The Supreme Court has held that parody may be a fair use within the meaning of §
107 of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
594 (1994). “Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as a ‘literary or artistic
work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or
ridicule,’ or as a ‘composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought
and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them
appear ridiculous.’” Id. at 580.
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composition. There was no change to this tattoo or any parody of the
71
tattoo itself.” In addition, Judge Perry suggested that use of other
tattoos besides Whitmill’s could have accomplished the same
72
purpose.
Further, in the context of addressing the tattoo Whitmill inked on
the face of Tyson, Judge Perry stated that tattoos are copyrightable:
Of course tattoos can be copyrighted. I don’t think there is any
reasonable dispute about that. They are not copyrighting Mr.
Tyson’s face, or restricting Mr. Tyson’s use of his own face, as the
defendant argues, or saying that someone who has a tattoo can’t
remove the tattoo or change it, but the tattoo itself and the design
itself can be copyrighted, and I think it’s entirely consistent with the
copyright law.73

It appears, therefore, that at least one court considers tattoos to be
protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1976. Shortly
following the court’s denial of Whitmill’s preliminary injunction
motion to enjoin the release of The Hangover Part II, however, the
74
parties dismissed the case. As a result, the Whitmill case failed to
provide a written precedent in support of the copyrightability of
tattoos.
B. Reed v. Nike, Inc.
In 2005, Matthew Reed, a tattoo artist and self-employed graphic
artist, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon against Rasheed Wallace, a player in the National
Basketball Association (“NBA”), footwear and sportswear company
75
Nike, and advertising agency Weiden + Kennedy.
Reed alleged that defendants Nike and Weiden + Kennedy directly
infringed his copyright in the tattoo affixed on the arm of Wallace in
the creation of an advertising campaign for Nike footwear on
76
television and on the Nike website. The advertisement included a

71

Whitmill Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 4.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Order of Dismissal, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011)
(dismissing case with prejudice and ordering each party to bear its own costs and
attorneys’ fees).
75 Reed Complaint, supra note 18.
76 Id. (stating that the advertising campaign included a commercial, which was
televised and accessible via the Internet, that Wallace appeared in that commercial, and
that the tattoo was prominently featured as Wallace described the creation and meaning of
72
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close-up of the tattoo and featured the tattoo being created by a
computerized simulation with a voice-over from Wallace describing
77
and explaining the meaning of the tattoo. After Reed saw the
advertisement, he filed an application to register copyrights for the
78
drawings related to the tattoo.
In addition to the direct infringement claim, Reed alleged that
Wallace contributorily infringed Reed’s copyright by advising Nike
and Weiden + Kennedy that Wallace owned all intellectual property
rights in the tattoo. Reed alleged a third claim for an accounting to
Reed for Wallace’s share of the proceeds from exploitation of the
tattoo in the event that Wallace was indeed determined to be a co79
owner of the tattoo.
Wallace signed a release during his initial meeting with Reed. The
“Information and Release Document” required the disclosure of any
of Wallace’s medical or skin conditions and certification that, among
other things, Wallace freely consented to having the tattoo applied
80
and released the tattoo parlor from any liability. However, the
agreement did not include any mention of an assignment or license of
81
Reed’s copyright interest in the work. Indeed, the document did not
make any reference to ownership interests in the artwork, sketches,
drawings, or resulting tattoo.
the tattoo). Reed alleged that he was never contacted by any of the defendants concerning
the use of the tattoo in the commercial. Id.
77 Harkins, supra note 19, at 317.
78 Id. at 316. The U.S. Copyright Office issued Reed two visual art Copyright
Registrations (VA 1-265-074 and VA 1-236-392) for the Egyptian Family Pencil
Drawings. Id.
79 Reed Complaint, supra note 18, at *3. Specifically, Mr. Reed alleged: “Wallace had
a meeting with Mr. Reed to discuss the artwork that would become the tattoo. Mr. Reed
listened to the ideas for the tattoo presented by Mr. Wallace[,] . . . took notes and made
sketches.” Id. Reed then created the artwork and presented it to Wallace and, after further
discussion of the artwork and suggested changes by Wallace, Reed then created a stencil
constituting “an intermediate step from which the drawing would be transferred to Mr.
Wallace’s upper arm.” Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012); Thomson v. Larson, 147
F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Joint authorship entitles the co-authors to equal undivided
interests in the whole work—in other words, each joint author has the right to use or to
license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other
joint owner for any profits that are made.”); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d
Cir. 1991); Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (“Joint authors co-owning copyright in a work are deemed to be tenants in common,
with each having an independent right to use or license the copyright, subject only to a
duty to account to the other co-owner for any profits earned thereby.”), aff’d without
consideration on this point, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
80 Reed Complaint, supra note 18, at Exhibit A.
81 Id. at 3.
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82

Reed sought a permanent injunction,
actual damages and
83
84
85
profits, prejudgment interest, and costs and attorney’s fees.
Ultimately, this case, which preceded Whitmill v. Warner Bros.
Entertainment, Inc., also settled pursuant to a confidential settlement
86
agreement. On October 19, 2005, the parties agreed to dismiss the
87
case.
Although Reed did not sue for copyright infringement until 2005,
one practitioner-scholar considers this case as “perhaps the first case
88
to assert copyright infringement based on a tattoo.” In 2006,
Christopher A. Harkins, a practicing attorney in Chicago, Illinois,
speculated that the case “may signal a floodgate for other lawsuits of
its kind and may inspire creative theories of copyright infringement
against other defendants in the media, sports, and entertainment
89
industries.” Unfortunately, there has been a trickle, rather than a
flood, of tattoo copyright cases since Reed v. Wallace. If only one or
two of these lawsuits are filed by tattoo artists every several years, it
is unlikely that a case will go to trial in the near future.
Without any such cases on the federal judicial docket, the courts
will not have the opportunity to resolve this area of the law, thus
leaving significant unpredictability as to the success of tattoo artists
when pursuing copyright claims. The work of tattoo artists is just as
90
entitled to copyright protection as other works of art; yet such
artists—who are already discouraged by the difficulty of monitoring
91
the unconsented use of their work by third parties —may be further
dissuaded from enforcing their copyrights due to the lack of
82

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
84 Id. at 7.
85 Id.
86 Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Reed, No. 05-CV-198 BR (D.Or. Oct. 19,
2005).
87 Id.
88 Harkins, supra note 19, at 315.
89 Id.
90 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 138 (concluding that tattoo art “deserves the
same respect and integrity as more conventional—we dare not say traditional—media such
as painting and sculpture”).
91 Id. at 100–01 (stating that “[t]he difficulty of monitoring the subject or others’
subsequent use of their designs may discourage many body artists from attempting to
enforce their rights, or even from registering their copyrights (a precondition to filing suit
and for obtaining statutory damages)” (citation omitted)); see also Beasley, supra note 24,
at 1161 (“[I]t would be very difficult for tattoo artists to identify people who had paid
infringing artists to tattoo the original artists’ work on their bodies.”).
83
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recognition of tattoo art as copyrightable subject matter by the federal
courts, coupled with the history of society’s marginalization of their
works and the derogatory view of the people who affix such works to
92
their skin. As a result, tattoo artists will continue to lose control of
their works.
C. Gonzalez v. Transfer Technologies, Inc.
While the above-referenced copyright infringement lawsuits filed
by tattoo artists have ended in settlement, one published decision has
assessed copyright protection in the context of temporary tattoos,
93
namely, Gonzales v. Transfer Technologies, Inc.
In this case, plaintiff David B. Gonzales owned copyrights on
94
several designs intended to be imprinted on T-shirts. Defendant
Transfer Technologies, Inc. reproduced four of plaintiff’s copyrighted
95
designs that were then sold by the defendant in the form of
96
temporary tattoos. When the plaintiff discovered the defendant’s
97
conduct, the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. After the
plaintiff filed suit, the defendant “promptly stopped producing and
98
selling the infringing tattoos.”
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois awarded the plaintiff minimum statutory damages of $750 for

92 See Mark Gustafson, The Tattoo in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond, in
WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (Jane
Caplan ed., 2000) (recognizing the double nature of tattoos as fascinating cultural features,
which are flaunted in public, television, magazines and other forms of media, but still
carry a looming meaning as “signs of degradation, criminality and deviance”); see also
Benson, supra note 33, at 242 (“It is asserted (with some truth) that, given the attitudes of
many towards the tattooed or extensively pierced, to engage in such practices is to place
oneself ‘outside society’; more importantly, however, that these practices in themselves
transgress or negate something central about the kind of person demanded by ‘society’ in
late capitalism.”).
93 301 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2002).
94 Id. at 608.
95 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (setting forth the exclusive bundle of rights of
the copyright owner: “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights . . . to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”).
96 Gonzales, 301 F.3d at 608.
97 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in
section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation
of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.”).
98 Gonzales, 301 F.3d at 608.
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each of the infringed copyrights, a total of $3000. Yet, the district
101
on the
court declined to award the plaintiff any attorneys’ fees
ground that “Transfer’s actions, though willful, are not the kind of
102
flagrant behavior that would justify an award of attorney’s fees.”
The plaintiff then appealed the district court’s ruling.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that, although the defendant’s
discontinuance of its willful infringing activities was a point in the
plaintiff’s favor, this fact alone was not a sufficient basis to deny an
103
award for attorneys’ fees.
David Nimmer, a professor at the UCLA School of Law, author of
the well-known treatise Nimmer on Copyright Law, and practicing
attorney in Los Angeles, California, described this case as one
“focusing on the defendant’s conduct, [which] offers no illumination
104
on whether a plaintiff may secure copyright protection in a tattoo.”
Nimmer observed that “copyright protection for tattoos is
105
While it is true that no federal court has
unprecedented.”
recognized the copyrightability of tattoos affixed onto the human
body, this observation does not further the resolution of the question
of whether such tattoos are copyrightable.
Professor Nimmer’s position on behalf of Warner Bros.
Entertainment in the Whitmill case has generated strong criticism
from fellow intellectual property scholars. Ann Bartow, a professor at
Pace Law School, wrote on a blog post that Nimmer’s new position
concerning the ineligibility of tattoos for copyright protection is a
99 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one
work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more
infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than
$30,000 as the court considers just.”).
100 Gonzales, 301 F.3d at 609 (noting plaintiff was not seeking an award of actual
damages).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶ 18. Nimmer’s observations were set forth in
his Declaration in Support of Warner Bros.’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id. Whitmill filed a motion to exclude David Nimmer’s
testimony on May 23, 2011 on the grounds that such expert testimony was nothing more
than “thinly disguised legal argument and an attempt to circumvent the Court’s already
generous 40-page limit for Defendant’s brief.” See Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude
Testimony of David Nimmer, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752. The court sustained Whitmill’s
motion. Id.
105 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶ 19.
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significant departure from his former position set forth in his
copyright treatise, which embraced tattoos as copyrightable subject
106
matter.
Furthermore, Douglas Lichtman, a professor at the UCLA School
of Law, wrote:
I find Nimmer’s declaration shockingly unconvincing. . . . Had he
argued that certain copyright remedies are off the table in instances
when some otherwise-traditional remedy would (if applied here)
constrain significant personal freedoms like the freedom to show
one’s own face in public, fine. But Nimmer argued that the tattoo is
not eligible for protection because it is not “fixed in a tangible
medium of expression” and thus fell short of a threshold
requirement that is codified in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.
That makes no sense.107

Tattoos—like any other creative work—are subject to the modest
requirements of copyrightability set forth in Section 102(a) of the
108
Copyright Act of 1976: originality and fixation of the work. As this
Article explores in further detail in Part III, there does not appear to
be any doctrinal basis for denying copyright protection for tattoos.
III
COPYRIGHTABILITY OF TATTOOS
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the “Power . . . to Promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
109
Writings and Discoveries . . . .” This constitutional clause (referred
to as the “Patent and Copyright Clause,” “Copyright Clause,” or
“Intellectual Property Clause”) gives Congress the power to enact
110
federal copyright statutes. Congress and the courts have struggled
106 Ann Bartow, When a Treatise Writer Tries to Reconfigure Copyright Law to Benefit
a Client, MADISONIAN (May 25, 2011), http://madisonian.net/2011/05/25/when-a-treatise
-writer-tries-to-reconfigure-copyright-law-to-benefit-a-client/ (stating Nimmer admitted in
his declaration that he had taken the position that tattoos were copyrightable but later
realized his conclusion was wrong, citing a law review article in which he determined that
the human body is not copyrightable, outside the context of tattoos).
107 Douglas Lichtman, Are Tattoos Eligible for Copyright Protection?, MEDIA INST.
(June 15, 2011), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2011/061511.php.
108 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
110 See id.
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to determine the extent of this constitutional grant of authority.
While there has been considerable debate concerning the meaning of
the terms “authors” and “writings” in the language of the clause, it is
clear that Congress only has authority to protect the works of an
112
“author” that fall into the category of “writings.”
However,
Congress is not obligated to extend the protection accorded to the
113
current broad array of subject matter.
114
Copyright law today is an exclusively federal subject matter. For
works created on or after January 1, 1978, the Copyright Act of 1976
115
is the governing law.
Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection
may extend to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
116
medium of expression.” This Congressional requirement is parsed
into two separate requisites for copyrightability. In order to be
protected under copyright law, a work must be both “original” and
117
“fixed.”
The current Copyright Act includes eight categories of
118
works of authorship eligible for copyright protection. Each of the
requirements of copyrightability and the categories of copyrightable
subject matter—as applied to tattoos—are discussed below.

111 See Ira L. Brandriss, Writing in Frost on a Window Pane: E-mail and Chatting on
RAM and Copyright Fixation, 43 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 237, 241 (1996). The
Copyright Act of 1976 and the previous federal copyright statutes do not define the term
“author.” See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). But see 17
U.S.C. § 101. However, the courts have broadly interpreted the term. See, e.g., BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (defining “author” as “he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science
or literature”).
112 See Brandriss, supra note 111, at 241–42.
113 See id.
114 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 11 (2003).
115 Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 111. The Copyright Act of 1976, which provides
the basic framework for the current copyright law, was enacted on October 19, 1976. Id.
As of October 2011, the United States copyright law is codified in chapters one through
eight and ten through twelve of Title 17 of the United States Code. See id.
116 Id.
117 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
118 Works of authorship include the following categories: “(1) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works.” Id.
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A. The Originality of Tattoos
The standard of originality for a copyrightable work is low. When
Congress drafted the 1976 Copyright Act, it intended to incorporate,
without any modifications, the definition of originality developed by
119
the courts at that time.
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Supreme Court set forth the current definition of originality:
“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
120
creativity.”
The Supreme Court not only addressed the low standard of
originality, but also the breadth of works that should be captured by
this standard. In the words of the Court, “[t]he vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no
121
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”
Therefore, the modern definition of originality is composed of two
requirements: independent creation of the work by the author and
122
display of a minimal level of creativity. Both of these requirements
123
are modest. A copyrightable work need not be unique or novel; all
that is required is that the author contributes something “recognizably
124
his own.”
Originality “means little more than a prohibition of
125
In other words, a minor addition of original
actual copying.”
126
expression by an author is sufficient to be copyrightable.
119 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664
[hereinafter Copyright Act Congressional Bill] (“The phrase ‘original works of
authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change
the standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute.
This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and
there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.”).
120 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)) (Court conceding that the
“requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice”).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
124 Id. at 103.
125 Id.
126 In the context of tattoo art, such as the Maori-inspired warrior tattoo at issue in
Whitmill v. Warner Bros., this could pose an obstacle to copyrightability due to the
possibility that the artwork was copied from tribal art in the public domain or “owned” by
another party, perhaps an indigenous culture. See Molly Torsen Stech, “Anonymous,
Untitled, Mixed Media”: Mixing Intellectual Property Law with Other Legal Philosophies
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In the context of tattoos, it is unquestionable that at least some such
127
artwork consists of independently created expression by an author.
Regarding the creativity requirement, it is not for the courts to
determine the level of creativity expressed in tattoo artwork as
compared with other copyrightable works or whether such artwork is
128
in good taste.
It is sufficient that such artwork possesses some
129
minimal spark of creativity.
The originality requirement should not present an obstacle to the
copyrightability of every tattoo. The more intriguing issues
concerning federal copyright protection for tattoo art arise as a result

to Protect Traditional Cultural Expressions, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 175 (2006)
(discussing the concerns with the lack of adequate legal protection provided by U.S.
intellectual property laws for traditional cultural expressions). Torsen has observed that the
Maori people “do not condone the existence of legal rights for their TCEs without talking
about the tribal or clan restraints and obligations imposed on those rights arising from their
cultural responsibilities.” Id. at 179. She has further noted that the beliefs of indigenous
cultures concerning the motivations for creation, use, or appreciation of traditional cultural
expressions are not reflected in Western intellectual property laws. See id. However, for
purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the tattoo artist has, at a minimum, added
original artwork to the design that is ultimately affixed to the skin.
127 However, this Article posits that a tattoo of one’s date of birth, without any artistic
features, would not meet the requisite level of original expression by an author. Nor is a
tattoo of a basic geometric shape, such as a circle, oval, or star, copyrightable, unless the
selection and arrangement of the geometric shape possesses the minimum level of
creativity. See Glasscraft Door I, L.P. v. Seybro Door & Weathership Co., 2009 WL
3460372, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2009). Tattoos used to create permanent makeup, such as
eyebrows, lip liner, or a freckle on a person’s face, would also fail to meet the requisite
level of originality for a copyrightable work. See Schueller, supra note 25, at 386
(discussing the use of tattoos as permanent makeup for burned or disfigured victims).
128 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. . . . Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. . . . At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.”).
129 Such creative works have even been used by the courts as a means of identification
of defendants in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. Meade, 474 S.E.2d 481, 486 (W.Va.
1996) (“Although the parties have cited no cases in this State involving the display of
tattoos to the jury by the accused in a criminal case, the existence of tattoos were factors to
be considered upon the issue of identification in State v. Tharp, 400 S.E.2d 300 (1990),
and State ex rel. Gonzales v. Wilt, 256 S.E.2d 15 (1979). Nevertheless, cases from other
jurisdictions clearly indicate that it is within the discretion of the trial court to require a
defendant to display tattoos to the jury in a criminal case, upon the issue of identification.
In Love v. State, 730 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), the defendant in an aggravated
sexual abuse case was required to remove his shirt ‘so the jury could view his unique body
markings.’ The context of the display concerned the identification of the defendant as the
assailant, and the Court, in Love, held that the display was proper.”).
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of the medium on which most tattoos are initially, or eventually,
130
expressed—the human body.
Courts do not seem to question the copyrightability of what is
commonly referred to as “tattoo flash”—pre-drawn artwork created
by tattoo artists and displayed as examples of their work and as
131
potential ideas for parties interested in receiving a tattoo.
Copyrightability of tattoos is not, and should not be, dependent on the
medium to which they are affixed. If a tattoo is copyrightable when
fixed in the tangible medium of a piece of paper, then it is
130 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶ 41 (positing that even if tattoos were to be
protectable under the Copyright Act, protection would not extend to tattoos after “they are
incorporated into items (human bodies) that form ‘useful articles’ in the copyright sense”).
131 Case law discussing the copyrightability of tattoo flash largely addresses disputes
that are contractual in nature (mostly involving licensing agreements) and thus are more
straightforward. Generally, ownership of tattoo design flash belongs to the artist upon
creation. The artist is then free to license the work to third parties. Litigation often arises
as to the scope of the licensing agreement. See, e.g., Tattoo Art, Inc. v. TAT Int’l, LLC,
794 F. Supp. 2d 634, 666 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding defendants infringed plaintiff’s
copyright in tattoo flash when defendants created tattoo designs from twenty-four of
plaintiff’s registered “books” and awarding statutory damages in the amount of $20,000
for each “book,” totaling $480,000). Compare, with Beasley, supra note 24, at 1157
(“Courts that have faced copyright lawsuits over flash designs have affirmed that flash art
is covered by copyright law. . . . None of [the] courts questioned whether flash art was
copyrightable, nor did any of the defendants in [the] three cases argue that flash art could
not be copyrighted.”). However, the cases cited by the author do not support this
conclusion. See id. For instance, in Gonzales v. Kid Zone, Ltd., 2001 WL 1329300 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 25, 2001), the court found the defendant’s tattoo designs not only “share[ed] the
ideas [the plaintiff] wished to convey[, but also] appropriated his expression” and thus
were infringing. Id. The court makes no broad ruling as to the copyrightability of tattoo
flash. See id. For further analysis of this case, see discussion infra Part II.C. In Owens v.
Ink Wizard Tattoos, 533 S.E.2d 722, 724 (Ga. 2000), finding the plaintiff’s “property” was
stolen by the defendants, the court upholds a preliminary injunction barring the defendants
“from photocopying, distributing and using the flash in violation of” a purchase agreement
between the plaintiff and the flash artist “that the flash was to be used only by [the
plaintiff] and not given or distributed to any other party” but makes no statement regarding
flash copyrightability. The court in S.T.R. Indus., Inc. v. Palmer Indus., Inc., 1999 WL
258455 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1999), explicitly states the issue of the validity of the registered
copyright need not be addressed. The lack of case law directly on point is perhaps due to
the nature of the medium (the human body). See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 17, at 100
(“The difficulty of monitoring the subject or others’ subsequent use of their designs may
discourage many body artists from attempting to enforce their rights.”). For a discussion of
the practice of tattooing, see Beasley, supra note 24, at 1157, 1162 (explaining that
“[c]lients often bring in photographs or drawings which they want copied exactly, or from
which they want the tattoo artist to base his or her conceptual framework in creating a new
drawing to be tattooed . . . [while o]ther clients choose from the dozens of flash drawings
in books, binders, and display screens that tattoo parlors make available”); see also
Hatcher, supra note 45, at 4 (explaining that the purpose of tattoo flash is to provide ideas
to walk-in customers seeking a tattoo, and that it is typically printed or drawn on paper or
cardboard and displayed on the walls of tattoo parlors or in binders).
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copyrightable if that tattoo is expressed on the medium of the human
132
skin.
B. Fixation of Tattoos on the Human Body
In order for a work to qualify for copyright protection under the
1976 Copyright Act, it must be “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which [the
expression] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
133
The statute broadly defines a fixed work as one “in a
device.”
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
134
duration.”
Courts have derived two sub-requirements of fixation from this
statutory language: the embodiment requirement and the duration
135
requirement.
The first requirement is that the work must be
embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be
136
perceived, reproduced, et cetera, from that medium.
The second
requirement is that the work must remain embodied in that medium
137
for more than a transitory period of duration. Unless both of these
requirements are met, a work is not “fixed” as defined in the
138
statute.
1. Is the Human Body a Medium of Expression?
Neither the language of the fixation definition set forth in Section
139
101 of the 1976 Copyright Act nor the legislative history of the Act
place any limitations on the copyrightability of a work fixed in a

132 This Article focuses on the copyrightability issues related to tattoos, but it does not
address (what are admittedly) a myriad of complexities that would arise from determining
infringement of a copyrighted tattoo expressed on the human body.
133 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (emphasis added).
134 17 U.S.C. § 101.
135 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“[N]o case law or other authority dissuades us from concluding that the definition of
‘fixed’ imposes both an embodiment requirement and a duration requirement.”).
136 Id. at 127.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 17 U.S.C. § 102.
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140

particular type of medium.
The statute provides no further
guidance regarding limitations on the protection of various media. In
addition, outside the context of technology cases, there are no
published decisions that seem to contemplate limitations on the
141
copyrightability of works based on the medium of fixation. While
the statute sets forth the requirement of fixation, and the courts have
parsed the fixation definition into the sub-requirements of
embodiment and duration, there is simply no mention of any requisite
media of expression or requisites that must be met by any of the
media of expression exemplified in the legislative history of the
Copyright Act.
The more relevant question in the context of the copyrightability of
tattoos is not whether the human body is a protectable medium, but
142
whether the human body fits the definition of a medium.
The
143
present Copyright Act and case law do not define the term. When a
statutory term is undefined, one must look to the “plain and ordinary”

140 See Copyright Act Congressional Bill, supra note 119, at 52 (“Under the bill it
makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—whether it is
in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia,
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural,
punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception
directly or by means of any machine or device ‘now known or later developed.’”); see also
Kelly M. Slavitt, Fixation of Derivative Works in a Tangible Medium: Technology Forces
a Reexamination, 46 IDEA 37, 52 (2005) (“The legislative history [of the Copyright Act]
states that one purpose of the [modified] definition [of fixation] was to resolve the status of
live broadcasts reaching the public in unfixed form but being simultaneously recorded,
which legislators determined would be fixed if the underlying work was copyrightable, as
a motion picture or sound recording. However, ‘fixed’ would not include ‘purely
evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the
‘memory’ of a computer.’”). The legislative history also determined that it makes no
difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation is, only that the embodiment “is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit the work to be perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” Id.
141 See Slavitt, supra note 140, at 97–98 (discussing the difficult questions raised
through case law related to new technologies and their continual challenge to the proper
interpretation and application of the law especially as applied to the fixation requirement);
see also Stefan Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in
U.S. Copyright Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 122–23 (2006) (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir. 1993), that a RAM copy lasting just one second is considered fixed “while an ice
sculpture that can last for hours (and even for months) is not considered fixed, is a very
clear indication of strong discrepancy in practical interpretation” (emphasis added)).
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Slavitt, supra note 140, at 52.
143 See Slavitt, supra note 140, at 61 (pointing out that the Copyright Act also “does not
specify that a derivative work must be fixed in a tangible medium”).
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144

meaning of the word.
In this context, the “plain and ordinary”
meaning of the term “medium” is “material or technical means of
145
If this definition is applied to tattoos, then
artistic expression.”
146
certainly the human body is a material means of artistic expression.
2. Are Tattoos Sufficiently Permanent or Stable?
The second threshold requirement is whether there exists sufficient
permanence or stability of the work. The application of this
requirement to tattoo art has received little scholarly analysis.
Professor David Nimmer made the following statement in his
declaration filed in support of the defendants in Whitmill v. Warner
Bros. Entertainment:
Copyright doctrine recognizes that various physical substrates may
be inadequate bases to secure protection. Classic examples include
writing a literary work in the wet sand before the oncoming tide or
147
inscribing a pictorial work in the frost of a windowpane.
While it is certainly true that a tattoo may be removed from the
human body, it does not wash away with the ease of a wave lapping
over the sand on a beach. Tattoo scholars have referred to the practice
148
of tattooing as “one of many forms of irreversible body alteration”
and believe that “the idea of the permanence of the tattoo is
149
150
critical.” Tattooing is “designed to last forever.”

144 See id. at 61 (stating that while many courts and practitioners consult legislative
histories when necessary to clarify the meaning of statutory language, this is inappropriate
where the plain meaning of a statute is clear). A “legal term of art” is given its peculiar
legal meaning; terms that have a unique legal meaning are given the definition found in a
lay dictionary. See, e.g., Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and
Copyright, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1455–56 (1986) (“Fixation, a requirement of statutory
copyright protection, is a term of art developed for the 1976 Copyright Act. Although the
Constitution speaks of securing rights to an author’s work, fixation is not mentioned in the
Constitution nor in any previous copyright legislation.”).
145 Medium,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/medium (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
146 See, e.g., Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implications of Tattoos: Why Getting
Inked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 2 (2011) (“The human body is
a peculiar artistic medium.”); Beasley, supra note 24, at 1145 (discussing a particular
tattoo artist’s own tattoo design inked on her back—“[t]he tattoo is an original work of
authorship, fixed on a tangible medium of expression: her body”).
147 See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, at 4, ¶ 14; see also D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.01[B][2][a], 2.03[B][2] (1965).
148 See Caplan, supra note 28.
149 Benson, supra note 33 (“This, in a culture so committed to constant change and
innovation, is surely what lies at the heart of the fear of the tattoo, for it is precisely the
permanence of the tattoo, its evocation of the private depths of the self upon the surfaces
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Despite the historical and symbolic permanence of tattoos,
advancements in laser skin resurfacing technology make them
151
However, tattoo removal is not a brief, effortless
removable.
process. A tattoo is removable through a series of laser treatments
over a period of months—a process that is expensive, painful, and not
152
always successful.
It is hardly questionable that a tattoo is
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
153
transitory duration.”
C. Category of Copyrightable Subject Matter for Tattoos
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act sets forth eight categories of
154
copyrightable subject matter. Each category of works is entitled to
155
a bundle of rights under Section 106 of the Copyright Act.
However, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner of any category
of works vary depending upon the categorization of the work.
Therefore, the classification of a work of authorship is integral to the
determination of the exclusive rights of the owner of the copyright in
that work of authorship.
In Whitmill, Nimmer testified that if tattoos are copyrightable, they
would be classified as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,”
which are defined in the first sentence of Section 101 of the Copyright
Act as “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
156
including architectural plans.” This Article concurs with Nimmer’s
categorization of tattoos as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
(hereinafter referred to as “PGS works”). However, this Article

of the body and its non-negotiable relationship to that body, that reminds us of the fixed
end-point of all this mutability and self-fashioning, our own death.”).
150 Caplan, supra note 28.
151 Bernadine Healy, M.D., supra note 30.
152 Id.
153 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
154 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see supra text accompanying note 120.
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. For example, the owner of a sound recording has the exclusive
right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”
Id. However, sound recordings are not specifically listed in §§ 106(4) or (5), and the courts
have interpreted the statute to exclude the owners of sound recording copyrights from a
general right of public performance or the right of public display.
156 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶ 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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disagrees with Nimmer’s rationale and conclusion that the useful
157
article doctrine precludes the copyrightability of tattoos.
The second sentence of Section 101 for PGS works further defines
and limits the scope of protection for PGS works. The definition
provides that:
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.158

Section 101 defines a useful article as a product “with an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
159
article.” Congress has provided examples of useful articles, such as
automobiles, airplanes, women’s clothing, electronics, and other
160
industrial products. Several circuit court decisions have examined
161
the copyrightability of useful articles, including belt buckles,
162
163
mannequins, and bicycle racks.
Nimmer asserts that a person’s
head qualifies as “infinitely more of a ‘useful article’ than does” a
164
While the human body certainly
number of industrial products.
performs a number of functions, it is highly unlikely that Congress or
the courts would characterize a person as a useful article. While
Nimmer concedes that Congress never intended for the useful article
doctrine to apply to the human body, he continues his analysis of the
165
doctrine as applied to a person.

157

Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶¶ 35–48.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
159 Id. Congress sought to narrow the scope of the definition of the former, broad
regulations of the U.S. Copyright Office, which defined a useful article as “one with utility
as its ‘sole intrinsic function.’” Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d
989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980).
160 Copyright Act Congressional Bill, supra note 119, at 55.
161 See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 991.
162 See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
163 See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
164 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 49, ¶ 37.
165 Nimmer also presumes that if Congress never intended for the human body to be an
article, then Congress must not have contemplated that human flesh would serve as the
medium of expression for a copyrightable work. Id.
158
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A useful article must meet an additional requirement to qualify as
166
Congress identified
copyrightable subject matter—separability.
167
two types of separability: physical and conceptual. As specified in
the definition of PGS works, only separable expressive features of
168
useful articles are copyrightable.
Therefore, copyright protection
would only extend to the PGS element of a useful article, not the
169
overall configuration of the useful article.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of extending copyright
protection to useful articles with expressive aspects in 1954 in Mazer
v. Stein, more than two decades before the enactment of the Copyright
170
In Mazer, the Respondents registered their lamp
Act of 1976.
171
bases,
separate from any of the lamp components, with the U.S.
172
Respondents subsequently sold the statuettes
Copyright Office.
173
The Court held that the
both as lamp bases and as statuettes.
statuettes, even when primarily used as lamp bases, were
174
copyrightable.
Thus, the statuettes, which were physically
separable from the remainder of the lamp, were protected by
copyright law. The Mazer case is cited in the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act (and Congress sought to codify Mazer’s holding
in the 1976 Act’s definitions); however, Mazer was decided based on
166

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Copyright Act Congressional Bill, supra note 119, at 55 (“Unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or any other industry
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted
under the bill.”). See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d
Cir. 1980) (“[T]he problem of determining when a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature
‘can be identified separately from, and [is] capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article’ . . . is particularly difficult because, according to the
legislative history explored by the court below, such separability may occur either
‘physically or conceptually.’”).
168 17 U.S.C. § 101.
169 Copyright Act Congressional Bill, supra note 119, at 55 (“[E]ven if the threedimensional design contains some [separately identifiable, aesthetic] element . . . copyright
protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover the over-all
configuration of the utilitarian article as such.”).
170 Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954), reh’g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954). The effective date of the Copyright Act of
1976 is January 1, 1978.
171 The lamp bases at issue in this case were “three-dimensional statuettes of male and
female dancing figures made of semi-vitreous china.” Stein, 204 F.2d at 473. Lamps serve
an “intrinsic utilitarian function” of providing light.
172 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 217.
167
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the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Copyright Office’s
175
regulations and the prior Copyright Acts.
Assuming that the human body is a useful article, tattoos are not
physically separable from a person. The tattoo is not capable of
existing independently of the human medium of expression. A tattoo
is not akin to a lamp base, which can exist on its own. A tattoo is a
sufficiently permanent part of the person’s body. Although the
process of tattoo removal has become less onerous in recent years, it
176
is difficult and painful to remove a tattoo from the skin. The tattoo
must be transferred to another medium of expression, such as paper,
in order to exist as an independent work of art. Such transference
would constitute a new work, not an independently copyrightable
feature of the former work.
A line of cases from the Second Circuit analyzed the issue of
conceptual separability. In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc., for example, the Second Circuit held that designer Barry
Kieselstein-Cord’s belt buckles were copyrightable because they
contained ornamental features that were separable from their
177
subsidiary utilitarian function. The court was persuaded by expert
testimony categorizing the buckles as creative art, the public’s use of
the buckles as ornamentation for parts of the body other than the
waist, and the exhibition of the buckles at the renowned Metropolitan
178
Museum of Art. In contrast, the Second Circuit later held in Carol
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp. that four human torso
mannequins were not subject to copyright protection because the
artistic features, “e.g., the life-size configuration of the breasts and the
175 Copyright Act Congressional Bill, supra note 119, at 55 (“A two-dimensional
painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is
printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers,
and the like. The same is true when a statute or carving is used to embellish an industrial
product, or as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a product without losing its ability to
exist independently as a work of art.”). Mazer “followed a ‘contemporaneous and longcontinued construction’ by the Copyright Office of the 1870 and 1874 Acts as well as the
1909 Act, under which the case was decided.” Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1980).
176 Caplan, supra note 28.
177 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. While the dissent noted the works were
aesthetically pleasing belt buckles, he concluded that their ornamental features were
inseparable from the important function of buckles “to keep the tops of trousers at waist
level.” Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 991, 994. The court also noted the recognition that Barry Kieselstein-Cord had
received in the fashion industry, including receipt of “a 1979 Coty American Fashion
Critics’ Award for his work in jewelry design as well as election in 1978 to the Council of
Fashion Designers of America.” Id. at 991.
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width of the shoulders [were] inextricably intertwined with the
179
The Barnhart court
utilitarian feature, the display of clothes.”
distinguished the Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles from the human torso
forms on the basis that the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were
180
not dictated by the utilitarian function of the useful article. Unlike
the human torsos, the belt buckles could perform their utilitarian
function without any of the distinctive ornamentation applied to the
181
buckles.
In assessing the copyrightablility of the useful articles at issue in
the two aforementioned cases—belt buckles and mannequins—the
Second Circuit used two different tests. The Kieselstein-Cord court
relied on the judgment of elite institutions and public use in non182
functional ways,
while the Barnhart court used the “ordinary use
183
as viewed by the average observer” test to determine whether there
were separate, identifiable design elements. If you apply either test to
tattoos, then the conclusion is that tattoos are conceptually separable
184
from the human body.
Applying the Kieselstein-Cord factors,
185
tattoos have been recognized as works of art by museums, and the
general public recognizes the aesthetic value of tattoos, separate from
any utilitarian function of the human body. Using the Barnhart test,
the ordinary use as viewed by the average observer of a tattoo is for
purposes other than the utilitarian function of the part of the human

179

Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 419.
181 Id.
182 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994 (“Indeed, body ornamentation has been an art
form since the earliest days, as anyone who has seen the Tutankhamen or Scythian gold
exhibits at the Metropolitan Museum will readily attest.”).
183 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5. Judge Newman’s dissent proposed another
test, which would examine whether the useful article stimulated a separable concept in the
mind of the beholder other than the utilitarian function. Id. at 422 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). The majority criticized the dissent’s test as “a standard so ethereal as to
amount to a ‘non-test’ that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer or
apply.” Id. at 419 n.5. The majority concluded that “Congress has made it reasonably clear
that copyrightability of the object should turn on its ordinary use as viewed by the average
observer.” Id. Therefore, the majority disagreed with the dissent that the mannequins could
be viewed as anything other than serving a utilitarian function as mannequins. Id.
184 Nimmer’s declaration concluded that only physical separability can apply to tattoos
because of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. Nimmer Declaration,
supra note 49, at 11, ¶ 45. While Thirteenth Amendment concerns may be relevant to the
breadth of enforcement of a tattoo copyright, this Article fails to see the relevance to the
copyrightability of tattoos, particularly the useful articles’ limitation on copyrightability.
185 See Benson, supra note 33.
180
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body on which the tattoo is affixed. In addition, the Barnhart court
rejected Barnhart’s argument that its human torsos were copyrightable
187
because a human torso is traditionally copyrightable. In response to
Barnhart’s assertions, the court concluded as follows:
We find no support in the statutory language or legislative history
for the claim that merely because a utilitarian article falls within a
traditional art form it is entitled to a lower level of scrutiny in
determining its copyrightability. Recognition of such a claim would
in any event conflict with the anti-discrimination principle.188

The Second Circuit has determined that “traditional works” have
not been accorded a lesser scrutiny. This Article posits that a tattoo
should not be accorded heightened scrutiny in determining its
copyrightability because it does not fall within a traditional art form.
Greater scrutiny of tattoos is also in violation of the antidiscrimination principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bleistein
189
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., in which the Court stated that it
is “a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
190
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” It
is not the position of the law to judge the aesthetic value of a tattoo. If
the tattoo meets the requirements of copyrightability and is
conceptually separable from the human body, then it is a
copyrightable PGS work.
CONCLUSION
At one time, tattoo artists and individuals with tattoos were
associated with criminals, men in the military, or risqué underground
social classes. Today, a young generation enjoys the acquisition of
symbolic body art. The demand for tattoo art has transformed the
nature of consumerism in this industry, and is therefore changing the
perception of the industry and the appeal of its artwork in the eyes of
the media and other businesses.

186 See Scheuller, supra note 25, at 386. This Article assumes for purposes of the
Barnhart test that the type of tattoo being evaluated is not permanent makeup, such as
eyebrows and the like. A permanent makeup tattoo would likely fail the Barnhart test
because the tattoo’s ordinary use would serve a utilitarian function.
187 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418.
188 Id.
189 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
190 Id.
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Tattoo artists should become more vigilant in the enforcement of
their rights in order to give the courts an opportunity to protect their
191
artistic work. Furthermore, the activities of companies like Warner
Bros. Entertainment will become more commonplace if tattoos are not
eligible for copyright protection. Media companies are becoming
more brazen in their use of tattoo artwork, which will continue to
192
whittle away any control tattoo artists have over their works.
The Whitmill case and the few other tattoo lawsuits to date
illustrate the challenges in providing copyright protection for tattoos.
While Professor Nimmer has raised legitimate concerns relevant to
the enforceability of tattoos, such objections do not address the
validity of a tattoo copyright. The concerns are a reflection of the
challenges of fitting unorthodox creativity into an outmoded analysis
of artwork. Although tattoos are unconventional under the traditional
understanding of copyright law, there is no support in the text of the
1976 Copyright Act for refusing to protect original tattoos. Therefore,
tattoos are copyrightable subject matter.

191 See Cotter and Mirabole, supra note 17, at 103 (“When courts do address these
issues, they will need to show sensitivity to the specific facts, and in some instances may
have to modify standard legal doctrines to account for the competing interests of the body
artist, the intellectual property rights owner, and the human subject.”).
192 See Beasley, supra note 24, at 1170 (concluding that while the tattoo industry’s own
social norms-based system is effective at discouraging other “established tattoo artists”
from unauthorized reproduction of another artist’s work, this regime is ineffective at
preventing copying by other third parties).
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